Thursday, March 01, 2007

What Would Iran Do?

I've been negligent in my posting. Here is an article I wrote, originally posted on www.DavidCorn.com on Feb. 22, 2007:

Stephanie Condon wrote the following posting, while I was waiting for a verdict in the Libby trial....

Today's UN announcement that Iran has failed to meet the Security Council's deadline for suspending its uranium enrichment activities will likely fuel talk of an US-Iran military confrontation. But if it should come to that, there's no assurance that the United States would benefit from the clash. In a paper posted yesterday by the British American Security Information Council, retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner warns that Iran's capacity to retaliate against a US military attack would be not one of shock-and-awe but, nevertheless, of significant consequence.

In the paper--titled General, you have the advantage of time: Iran's response to the U.S. military option--Gardiner speculates that Iran's retaliation would be subtle and indirect--and perhaps set off explosive results throughout the entire region. Tehran could easily create more havoc for the United States in Iraq, Gardiner asserts, by boosting whatever assistance it provides Shia militia groups and by threatening the flow of oil in the region. It would also be able to summon up regional support, Gardiner says. With the right rhetoric, Iran could associate Israel with any U.S. military action, prompting Hamas and Hezbollah to step up attacks there. The results across the region would be unpredictable.

Writing as if he were an Iranian strategist submitting a memo to Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Gardiner notes,

Time is on Iran's side. Even after a U.S. strike, some of our options will even improve if they unfold slowly. That's particularly true of using oil leverage. Low signature but significant cuts in oil flow raise the prices, benefit us, and force the U.S. to pay. Low signature, drawn-out responses reduce the likelihood of additional U.S. attacks. A slow and low-signature response is important beyond preventing U.S. retaliation. Iran has another important interest: preventing chaos. The strategy I have outlined offers the best chance for first, deterring a U.S. attack, and second, if deterrence fails, inflicting long, drawn out and ultimately unacceptable pain on them while minimizing the chances of a second attack on the Islamic Republic, and leaving the government in the best position to harness the national will and international outrage against the aggressors while controlling the popular reaction. It will show that while we have retaliatory capability, we are reasonable and moderate in the face of unprovoked and outrageous attacks by the imperialist forces. It could play a central role in changing the international balance of power away from the Americans. In the end, Iran's influence in the region will be strengthened by a U.S. attack.

Despite appearances to the contrary, the administration insists that it does not desire a military clash with Iran. Perhaps they've already figured out what Gardiner has.

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